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When we talk about the God -  world relationship we have two juxtapositional 
solutions: there is on one hand pantheism, and on the other hand -  classical theism. 
Pantheism with its lack of the divine personality and transcendence hardly escapes 
atheism. The classical theism of Thomas Aquinas, which shows an absolute divinity, 
has its problems with the God -  world relationship, where the world does not have 
any impact on God because he is infinitely distant from the world. Therefore the 
Thomistic God is impassible and does not need the world. The absoluteness of God 
influences the Thomistic descriptions of God: we can rather say what God is not than 
what he is positively. Hartshome claims his panentheistic doctrine to be a central 
solution in comparison to classical theism and pantheism, which is able to overcome 
the problems of the two interpretations1.
Hartshome’s solution ascribes to God personality and transcendence, which is 
contrary to pantheism. Contrary to Thomism, Hartshome acknowledges that God 
does depend on the world because the world is his body. Hartshome also says that 
we have positive insight into what God is. In this aspect Hartshome is more optimis­
tic than Aquinas. On the other hand according to me the Hartshomean solution is not 
free from problems. The most important one has to do with the conception of tran­
scendence, and in turn may have an impact on the notion of deity and the divine in­
fluence upon the world. In my opinion it is necessary that if talking about the divine 
transcendence upon the world, we should qualify this as a difference of nature, i.e. 
difference in principle. Otherwise we cannot talk sufficiently about transcendence of 
God but only about his greater perfection. It seems that the latter case might be the 
Hartshomean understanding of transcendence of God upon the world; God is not
1 Ch. Hartshome. Man’s Vision of God and the Logic o f Theism, Chicago 1941, p. 348.
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totally different -  God is only the highest degree of the values that are in the world. 
Sia commenting the Hartshomean notion of transcendence says that there is differ­
ence in principle between the world and God: There is about God superiority in prin­
ciple when compared with any other individual2. 1 want to examin whether it is real­
ly so3. Therefore after presenting some critics of the Hartshomean notion of tran­
scendence I will define the notion of the difference in principle and according to this 
criterion I will exam the most fundamental Hartshome’s statements about the divine 
transcendence.
1. DIFFICULTIES OF HARTSHORNE'S INTERPRETATION
Hartshome says explicitly that his system is different from the pantheistic solu­
tion. If we describe pantheism as a system in which God is impersonal and not tran­
scendent to the world, then Hartshome’s solution seems to overcome this weakness 
because for him God is a person and is relative to every being in the world. Through 
this relativity God transcends all beings4. This kind of relativity leads to the unsur- 
passability of God. The world as a unity does not feel and does not remember per­
fectly; the world is not a person. What is more, the world is not any metaphysical 
unity at all. But God surpasses all these imperfections of the world, and in this way 
God is unsurpassable. The unsurpassability of God is something opposite to the frag­
mentation of the world. The particular elements of the world are merely fragments 
of a bigger wholeness. All this shows that God transcends the world and is different 
from it. Sia stresses that among all the divine features, unsurpassability is especially 
responsible for the divine transcendence. There is no other being, which could com­
pete with God, not even the whole world as such.5 Other features, which express the 
divine unsurpassability and distinguish God from the world, are eminence and wor- 
shipfullness. Only God is unsurpassable, eminent and thus worshipful6. This notion 
of transcendence, which is grounded in the notion of unsurpassability, is at the basis 
of the Hartshomean conception of divinity.
Let us now take a look at some of the criticism of Hartshome’s conception of 
transcendence and divinity.
Ford criticizes the Hartshomean understanding of the difference between the 
world and God, pointing out that if God is to be different from the world, God has to
2 S. Sia, God in Process Thought. A Study in Charles Hartshorne’s Concept o f God, Dordrecht 
-  Boston -  Lancaster 1985, p. 48.
3 I do not want to present the problems that Aquinas and Spinoza have to deal with. All the 
Thomistic opinions I present in this text are there in order to emphasize a point o f view different 
from the Hartshomean one.
4 Ch. Hartshome, The Divine Relativity. A Social Conception of God, New Haven-London, 
1948, p. 89.
5 Sia, God in, pp. 42-43.
6 Ibid., pp. 36, 47-48.
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be different from it in principle. The dipolar nature of God does not guarantee the 
essential difference between these two elements of reality, though it is necessary to 
guarantee the basic level of the transcendence of God. If God were not essentially 
different from the world this could mean that God is not transcendent enough to the 
world and therefore Hartshome could not be said to overcome pantheism, according 
to which God and the world are the same. Ford also emphasizes that the Hartshome­
an God does not transcend time, because he is purely in time. In this way he cannot 
act in the presentness, which is necessary in order to act in the world7. Therefore 
God needs a nontemporal element -Ford suggests8. Since the world is purely tempo­
ral God could be different in principle, if he had a nontemporal element. That is why 
Ford says -  analyzing Hartshome’s theory -  that the difference between the above 
mentioned elements is not essential9.
Gutowski in turn says that even though God is a necessary being, this is not suf­
ficient ground for acknowledging that God is transcendent to the world. The world 
as a compound of beings, which form the world, is as everlasting as God, in which 
case the world as such and God are both necessary and contingent beings. God can­
not exist without the world and the world cannot exist without God. In this sense 
God is not different from the world. The only difference between them is that God is 
the unity of the world10.
According to me this notion of transcendence does not guarantee God to be es­
sentially different from the world11, which is necessary in order to ascribe divinity to 
the unity of the world and call it God. It seems that the Hartshomean notion of the 
divine dependence upon the world modifies God’s transcendence in such a way that 
God is seen as a world-like component. If so, can we ascribe divinity to this kind of 
unity? We should remember that there might be different levels of transcendence. 
This one rather indicates that the Hartshomean solution is more pantheistic, where 
god is hardly God.
2. DEFINITION OF THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE
In order to check whether this criticism is justified, let us examine Hartshome’s 
statements concerning divine transcendence.
First let us try to define the difference in principle, i.e. the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative (essential) difference. We call A as quantitatively differ-
7 L. S. Ford, Temporality and Transcendence, In: Hartshome, Process Philosophy, and The­
ology, ed. R. Kane, S. H. Phillips, Albany 1989, pp. 162-163.
8 L. S. Ford, God as a Temporally-Ordered Society. Some Objections, ‘Tulane Studies in Phi­
losophy’, 34 (1986), p. 44.
9 Ford, Temporality, p. 162.
10 P. Gutowski, Filozofia procesu i je j  metafilozofia. Studium metafizyki Ch. Hartshome’a, 
Lublin 1995, pp. 98-99.
11 I use the terms: difference of nature, essential difference, quantitative difference to express 
the same thing.
298 RAFAŁ S. NIZIŃSK.I
ent from B if A has the same attributes as B but these attributes differ only in degree 
or intensity. We call the difference between A and B as qualitative (essential) if 
A has attributes that B does not have. The consequence of the qualitative difference is 
a difference of nature, i.e. the way something acts. If A is qualitatively different from 
B, then A can act in the way that B cannot. The distinction between stone A and stone 
B is quantitative if both have the same attributes, which determine that they are stones. 
Even if they had different colors that would mean that there is only some difference in 
the surface of the stones where one reflects one portion of light and the other another 
portion of light. The stones can have different colors because color does not determine 
that a stone is a stone, i.e. it does not determine the essence of the stone. But there is 
a qualitative difference between a stone and a human being, where the latter one thinks, 
if thinking is something that differs from non-thinking.
We can give another example of the essential difference. Let us turn towards 
Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy of religion. He says that people and God have mind. 
The difference between the two is essential even though Aquinas uses the same word 
mind to describe the different realities. The human mind is a part of the human be­
ing. Humans think in time, which means there is a process of acquiring knowledge. 
The human mind gains some knowledge by turning towards the object. The effect of 
the cognitive process is that the mental form of the object exists in the mind of the 
subject. In God it is quite different. The divine mind is not any part of God. The 
entire divine being is his own mind. There is also no cognitive process in God be­
cause everything happens out of time. God knows everything eternally, where eter­
nity is understood as timelessness. God does not have to turn towards the object in 
order to know it. God knows every object by having its mental form in himself be­
cause God gives existence to every object12. In both cases we can call it mind since 
there is a mental form of the object in God and in a human being. However, the at­
tributes of the human mind and of the divine mind are quite different. In one case it 
is part of the being but in another case it is the entire being. One knows by turning 
towards the object, the other knows in himself. One operates in time, the other one 
out of time. These two concepts of mind are an example of what we call the differ­
ence in principle.
3. HARTSHORNE'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD -  GOD DIFFERENCE
Once I have defined the notion of the difference in principle let us now examine 
some Hartshomean examples of the differences between God and the world. In this 
way we can examine to what category of the above mentioned difference should be 
ascribed.
12 Th. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 8.
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Mind -  body model
Hartshome says that the God -  world relationship can be compared to the mind
-  body relationship. This comparison shows how Hartshome understands the differ­
ence between God and the world. According to him there is an analogy between the 
structures of the human mind -  body relationship and the God -  world relationship. 
How is it possible that we may use this analogy in order to determine the kind of 
God -  world relationship? Hartshome says that the only knowledge that we have 
before analyzing the nature of God is the human nature, i.e. ourselves. If we make 
this relationship sufficiently general we can interpret the God -  world relationship in 
terms of the mind -  body relationship13. In these terms the world has the function of 
the body, and God of the mind. The mind is something, which arises from the body, 
where the body is a compound of individual beings and the mind is one being. The 
mind is the unity of the body. We can say the same about God: the world is the body 
of God, who is the unity of the world. The world is a compound of beings and God 
as a single being is its unity. The world as such is not a unity. Its unity is God. This 
is the first difference between the world and God: the world is not a unity because it 
is a compound, and God is a unity. That really is a difference in principle between 
these two elements of the reality because God is an integrated being, which the world 
is not. Therefore, God can act as one being, which the world cannot do.
On the other hand we should remember that every single process that takes place 
in the world is also a unity of a limited number of processes, as it has a limited 
number of objects that it is related to. However, God has as his object all the proc­
esses in the world; God is always a single process, i.e. the unity of the world. This is 
the difference between God and any other individual being. We realize that in the 
case of the God -  world comparison there is an essential difference, but we cannot 
acknowledge this kind of difference if we compare God to any concrete being in the 
world, since God is in contact with all the beings of the world where a single being 
has limited contact with other beings. The difference between the two is only of an 
extensional character. In this way God is unsurpassable, whereas the beings that form 
the world are not unsurpassable.
We should not think that if God has the nature of the mind it is something op­
posed to the body. God has a different function in the reality but the same nature; he 
is a feeling subject. He is a creative synthesis as every feeling is. He is unsurpassa- 
bly more complex than the world. On the other hand the world is not any subject as 
God is. We should remember that there is a difference between a single being, which 
is a part of the world and the world as such. A single being is a unity of other beings 
and it is a subject. It feels. The world is not a subject, and therefore not a being. The 
world does not feel either. Yes, the world is a unity of all the beings but as an object. 
As long as it is a simple unity of all the beings the world is always an object. The 
unity of the world, which is a subject, is God. Only God feels and is a being. God in
13 Hartshome, Man's, pp. 175-176.
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this case is essentially different from the world14. Hartshome rejects the possibility 
that the sum of all the beings in the world is God. The real unity must always be 
a subject, and this subject is more than a sheer sum of all the beings. God surpasses 
the world with his complexity and feeling. God feels the whole world. If we com­
pare a single worldly being with God we notice that again the difference has to do 
with the extension of the relativity. On the other hand if we compare the objectivity 
of the world with the subjectivity of God we have to admit that there is a difference 
in principle. The world is not any subject, because it does not feel.
The fact that God has a divine mind is without any doubt an essential difference 
in comparison to the world. But if we compare the subjectivity of God with the sub­
jectivity of any being we have to admit that all the beings are subjects. Only the 
world does not have any mind since it is not a subject. We can compare the human 
mind with the divine one. If there is an essential difference between the world and 
God in this aspect, there is another kind of difference between the divine mind and 
the human one. Contrary to the limited power of the human mind, Hartshome is de­
scribing the unsurpassability of the divine mind in terms of perfection and maximal 
extension of the divine knowledge. Humans know imperfectly because our mind is 
fallible. We can also only know things, which we are in contact with, and this limits 
the scope of our cognition. We have imperfect and limited knowledge because our 
mind is limited. God knows everything that is to know. His knowledge is error free. 
He knows unsurpassably more than other minds. In terms of the above-defined es­
sential difference, we can say that there is no qualitative difference between the hu­
man and divine mind. Hartshome states explicitly that the only dimensions by which 
the divine knowledge and power are superior to worldly ones are those of scope and 
completeness15. God knows and wants eminenter, in a uniquely exalted fashion16.
Only the unity and personality mean that God is essentially different from the 
world as such. Without the unity that God gives to the world, the world would be 
a compound of individuals. God gives unity to the world, which the world does not 
have by itself. If we compare God to other beings we notice that God is not essen­
tially different from them. He is rather superior than essentially different.
The God -  world relationship
Hartshome analyzes whether God is all-inclusive or not. He comes to the con­
clusion that God can only be all-inclusive because otherwise he would just be a part 
of the whole and not the supreme reality after all. God has to be all-inclusive o f all 
relative things, but also o f  “the absolute ”, which is indeed but an abstract aspect o f  
relative reality, its relativity as such or in principle11. This is a proof of the lack of
14 Gutowski, Filozofia procesu, p. 101.
15 Hartshome, Man’s, p. 178.
16 Ibid., p. 180.
17 Ch. Hartshome, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, Lanham 1983, p. 48.
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an essential difference between the world and God. If both can compete in respect of 
being parts of the totality that means that the world and God have some common 
ground where they can compete. For Aquinas there is no such common ground, and 
therefore reality consists of all the beings and God. That means that numerically God 
is less than the whole reality, which does not undermine his perfection. It would 
undermine his perfection if God had some common ground of comparison with the 
world. The world cannot compete with God, therefore for Aquinas, God does not 
have to be all-inclusive. God and the world are different and somehow independent 
beings. The independence of the world from God does not impair the absoluteness 
of God. God is above any comparison to the world on account of his different na­
ture18 and even an infinite number of other beings does not diminish his supremacy. 
Thomism understands the perfection of God intensively and not extensively. Even 
though the world is spatial it does not mean that it is in any sense an obstruction to 
the infinity of God, because God is out of space. Therefore only if there is a com­
mon ground, on which the world and God can compete, there is also mutual limita­
tion of perfection. This limitation of perfection is not present in Thomism because 
God and the world exist on different levels.
It is also possible to understand that reality has to be synonymous with God, who 
includes the world in order to guarantee his supremacy over the whole reality. This 
is the stance that Hartshome adopts. It means that God is to be understood as inten­
sively, and therefore also extensively compatible with the world. In this case God 
must be all-inclusive. We can notice how this notion of perfection of God influences 
Hartshome’s understanding of the biblical commandment to love God and one’s 
neighbor. If we are to love God and others with all our hearts, it is only possible if 
God and our neighbor are the same -  says Hartshome. If the neighbor is somehow 
God, we can love him as God. Only then it is possible to love a being and God. What 
is necessary is that love should not be divided between God and other beings. Hart­
shome says that the difference between the world and God should be in God. It is 
possible only if God is the wholeness of reality. Then it is possible to love some­
thing else and him without splitting love. If John and God were different, the act of 
attention concentrated on John would be a distraction from God. John would be com- 
petitory in respect to God. If God were quite different from John, that would mean 
that the commandment of loving God with all the heart while loving something else 
would be impossible to fulfill. The conclusion that Hartshome reaches is that John 
has to be an aspect of God19. Hartshome says explicitly that the neighbor has to be ‘a 
constituent of divine life’.
At this point we can ask whether the Hartshomean interpretation of the Bible 
were possible if God were different in principle? Could a human being be a constit­
uent of the divine life if it were essentially different from God? Would it be possible 
to say that John is somehow God if there was no essential similarity between John
18 Aquinas, S. Th., I, 3, 5; Ibid., I, 7, 1 ad 3.
19 Hartshome, Creative, pp. 148-149.
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and God? Hartshome’s interpretation is panentheistical, which means that the world 
is included in God, where God is the unity of the world. If God were a simple unity 
of the world that would lead to a sure answer: there is not any difference in princi­
ple. The definition of process says that it is an inclusive being. God is also an inclu­
sive being, which means that he is not a simple inclusion of the world. God, contrary 
to the world, is a subject, which means that he adds to the world one value, which 
the world does not have, i.e. unity. Therefore the question if the neighbor can be 
a constituent of divine life, because he is essentially different from God, is not so 
simple to answer. But the fact that John as a being can limit the divine perfection 
indicates that God and John are somehow similar and that they are intensively alike.
We should also keep in mind one other thing. There is no spatio -  temporal dif­
ference between the world and God. According to Hartshome time is the succession 
of actual beings one after another. Space is the coexistence of actual beings. God 
does not exist outside the world, so there is no out of the world (spatially understood) 
element of God. Therefore, if the world is everlasting so is God. There is not any 
temporal difference between the two. The notion of God is correlated to the notion 
of the world. Both elements are one thing but we can say that only God is everything 
and wholly other. All the things (the world) are in him.
Descriptions of God
When talking about the generalization of the human values that we use while 
describing God we should ask about the right to do so. Is it possible to use anthropo­
logical expressions to describe God, as Hartshome does20 without a tacit acknowl­
edgment that God is not qualitatively different from the world? Hartshome describes 
God using the values that are present in humans. The difference in usage is that they 
are present in God as an infinite degree of human values. Also all that we say about 
God can be used to describe humans but in a finite way. We should remember that 
these attributes are in God infinitively more perfect21. The fact that God has absolute 
features makes him an extraordinary being, which is different from the world. Only 
God has absolute qualities, which preserve him from being understood in terms of 
a human being -  says Hartshome. For example, God is wholly relative and wholly 
non-relative; humans are not22. But Hartshome does not use any negation of the val­
ues that are in humans in order to describe God. He makes them only eminent (supe­
rior), which does not guarantee the essential difference of God. Kane stresses that in 
both cases divine transcendence is understood as excellence of nature23. Excellence 
should be understood as an eminent level, which is something else than the differ­
ence in principle -  I would reply.
20 Hartshome, Man's, p. 178.
21 Ibid., p. 220.
22 Hartshome, Divine, p. 32.
23 R. H. Kane, Transcendence, Temporality and Personal Identity: a Response to Ford, in: 
Hartshome, Process Philosophy, and Theology, ed. R. Kane, S. H. Phillips, Albany 1989, p. 170.
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Examining the notions that Hartshome uses to describe God we realize that he 
is using a certain form of analogy, because there is a certain similarity between God 
and the world. We can know literally and positively something about God. Know­
ing, for example, how humans love we can say by analogy how God loves. We do 
not know the quality of his love. The reason for that is that we do not know the ac­
tual state of God’s love. Hartshome’s statements about the divine love are mostly 
positive. He says that God loves eminently. The reason for this is that God loves 
every being and humans always love a limited number of beings24. Only the divine 
love is perfect. We also ascribe eminence to his power and knowledge. According to 
Aquinas we do not know how love is present in God. We can rather say what love is 
not in God than how it really exists in God25. Thomism also uses analogy but the 
difference consists in emphasizing the negative aspects of our knowledge about val­
ues in God. The Thomistic understanding of analogy stresses mostly the difference 
and not similarity between God and the world. Therefore Aquinas says that God is 
rather different from the world than similar. God is almost incomparable to the 
world26. The word almost is very important because there is a slight similarity be­
tween them. For example: God loves out of time, unchangeably and infinitely. His 
love is not different from his being because God and his love are one being. The 
similarity to human love is very small. It is even better to say that it is dissimilar. 
Hartshome rejects the negative aspect of the Thomistic descriptions of God27. A fol­
lower of Aquinas would say the reason for that is that Hartshome rejects the differ­
ence in principle. To a Thomist, Hartshome does not accept that God essentially dif­
fers from the world and this distinction regarding natures is important for Thomism. 
Hartshome emphasizes that we do not know how God loves actually, in order to 
show that we do not know everything about him. But he does not show that God is 
inaccessible. We cannot know literally how a person in front of me loves now, be­
cause it is impossible for me to be him or her. Therefore we do not know how God 
loves actually. God as a concrete actuality is inaccessible, according to Hartshome, 
because actuality is inaccessible. But I would say that every concrete actuality as 
such is inaccessible.
Hartshome says that the categories we use to describe God can be used only in 
order to describe God and not the world. The described features exist in God in quite 
a different way. They exist in God in a superior way. Only God can be described in 
terms of supreme relativity and independence. That should be a proof that Hartshome 
avoids ascribing to God terms, which could be used to describe other beings28. It does 
not seem to be convincing enough because other beings can also be described in 
terms of relativity and independence. The adjective supreme expresses the highest in
24 Sia, God in, pp. 28-29.
25 Aquinas, S. Th., I, 3 intr.
26 Ibid., I, 4, 3 ad 4.
27 Sia, God in, p. 47.
28 Hartshome, Divine, p. 32.
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rank but not necessarily a different quality in principle. At some other point Hart­
shome says that, for example, a person, who is listening to poetry is also to a certain 
extent independent from other pieces of poetry, which he had not listened to. Thus 
we can also ascribe certain relativity and independence to that person. So, we can 
say that this person also has a certain, i.e. lower level of absoluteness29. It is so, be­
cause all beings have an abstract and concrete element30. On the other hand, if we 
know that relatedness is a common quality of the whole reality that means that the 
whole reality cannot be divided into parts, where either there is or there is not rela­
tivity. Summing up, I can say that the qualities we ascribe to God are also present in 
other beings. The difference consists in the degree of the value ascribed to God and 
to any other being. In God they are present supremely, and he is unsurpassable in 
this sense. The supreme degree of the values, which are present in God, is consid­
ered by Hartshome as sufficient reason to acknowledge that God is different in prin­
ciple, with which I do not agree.
On the other hand, Hartshome claims that one of the reasons for errors that exist 
in the philosophy of religion is a poor understanding of human nature. According to 
him, anthropology is the key to understanding reality31. Hartshome often uses anthro­
pological expressions in his descriptions. Let us give some examples: the notion of 
creative synthesis originates in the human process of cognition; the divine love is 
a notion based on human love; the God -  world relationship is analogical to the mind
-  body relationship. All these concepts have their source in human experience.
We should acknowledge that one of the advantages of the Hartshomean concep­
tion of God is the possibility of more positive descriptions of God. We can ascribe to 
God every value that we find in the world, because the world and God are more sim­
ilar to each other than different32. Ascribing these values to God we have to intensify 
their presence in him, saying that they reach the unsurpassable level in God. It is 
easier for Hartshome than it is in classical theism to answer the question of how 
a given value is present in God. Is this progress in the philosophy of religion, if by 
progress we understand a possibility of more positive descriptions of God? Yes, there 
is some progress, but the price that Hartshome is paying for it is high; God and 
worldly beings are very similar and this is the most striking controversy. This weak­
ens the notion of the divine transcendence, which is reason for criticism on the part 
of those who do not accept the Hartshomean notion of God.
One more remark: analyzing this concept of divinity we can reach the conclu­
sion that we can somehow know God using our senses because there is but little dif­
ference of natures. Sia, commenting on Hartshome, partially agrees with this argu­
ment acknowledging that the world we can get in touch with is a part of the body of
29 Ibid., p. 76.
30 Sia, God in., p. 42.
31 Hartshome, Ch. Can We Understand God?, ‘Louvain Studies’ 7(1978), no. 2, pp. 75-84.
32 Hartshome, Divine, p. 28.
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God. But the sensual experience does not represent God to the whole extent and as 
a subject33.
Divine beauty
Hartshome criticizes Thomas Aquinas for his concept of God understood as pure 
act. Hartshome gives beauty as an example, which should show that the notion of 
pure act is contradictory. Hartshome understands beauty as a certain unity in the 
multiplicity of contrasts, which have been experienced by a subject34. According to 
the Hartshomean conception of divine beauty, all the concrete contrasts that are 
present in the world have to be included in God. If God were conceived as pure act 
that would mean that he is the unchangeable infinite fullness of beauty. If he is the 
unchangeable fullness of beauty that means that some possible cases of beauty have 
to be excluded from God, because in every actual state of the world there are some 
cases, which exclude some other cases of beauty. Sometimes some elements of beau­
ty exclude each other. Therefore in every worldly sum of all the cases of beauty there 
are some cases, which are not included35. The conclusion is that God cannot be pure 
act, i.e. actually infinite36. The latter remark shows that Hartshome understands pure 
act as a unity of all the possible cases of beauty even of these that exclude each oth­
er. This is so, because according to Hartshome, God should unify all the values that 
are in the world (which is impossible if God were pure act). Otherwise talking about 
the presence of all the values in God would be fiction. The beauty of the actual world 
has to be somehow present in God -  says Hartshome. In Hartshome’s understanding 
of beauty, if God were pure act that would lead to the possession of mutually ex­
cluding values37. We can notice that Hartshome has a quantitative understanding of 
the pure act. It is clear that the mentioned act could not exist, because it would be 
a sum of all possibilities. We notice in the interpretation of the philosophy of Tho­
mas Aquinas presented by Hartshome that the latter criticizes Aquinas’ notion of 
pure act, which Aquinas understands as completely different from the beauty of the 
world. For Aquinas the beauty of God does not consist in enclosing all possible cas­
es of contrasts. The divine beauty is understood as quite different from the worldly 
one. It is not a sum of all possible contrasts but fullness, i.e. the absolute beauty. It 
means that God himself is a unique example of beauty, completely different from 
any case of beauty in the world, which is unchangeable, simple (without any parts), 
nontemporal and without any limitations of harmony38. Aquinas does not understand 
the harmony in God as a unity of contrasts. Beauty is the divine being himself39. In
33 Sia, God in., p. 26.
34 Hartshome, Creative, p. 303.
35 Ibid., p. 229.
36 Ibid., p. 235.
37 Hartshome, Man's, p. 219.
38 Aquinas, S. Th., I, 13, 12.
39 Ibid., I, 2, 3 (quarta via).
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this case the divine beauty is essentially different from any particular instances of 
beauty in the world. Thomas Aquinas understands the difference between the beauty 
of the world and of God intensively and not extensively. By Hartshome it is under­
stood mostly extensively, therefore he has to reject the notion of pure act.
Transcendence
Hartshome tries to overcome the problems resulting from the classical under­
standing of transcendence. According to him transcendent means independent under 
a certain aspect and dependent under a certain aspect. Every being is somehow tran­
scendent. For example the human body transcends the particular cells. In the human 
body there is an interaction between particular cells of the organism. On the other 
hand the whole body interacts with the all the cells of the body, which is contrary to 
the limited contact of the particular cells. In this aspect the body transcends the cells 
of the body. We can talk about the transcendence of the whole body in respect to the 
parts of the body. The body as a unity influences the whole body, whereas particular 
cells influence only some other cells. This is the positive element of the notion of 
transcendence, which has been forgotten40 -  says Hartshome. Also in this case we 
have a clear example of a quantitative understanding of the difference between God 
and the world, where the cells are the parts of the body, which is the world. There is 
also a second aspect of the positive side of transcendence; i.e. independence under 
a certain aspect. For example, listening to somebody does not mean being complete­
ly dependent on that person. By listening to some words I can change my opinion 
only in some aspect, but some other ideas, which I have, still remain unchanged. On 
one hand, I am completely open to the new ideas; on the other hand I do not accept 
them. The unchanged part of my opinions is an abstract part of the concrete being, 
which is changeable, as the concrete always depends on other beings. Each being 
has both aspects41 and God transcends the world in both aspects. Both aspects seem 
in God to be only quantitatively different from the ones worldly beings have.
Sia adds yet another example of God’s transcendence. He explains that accord­
ing to Hartshome God loves more intensively than other beings. Only God himself 
can overcome the intensity of his own love. In this sense God is unsurpassable. Again 
my remark: this aspect does not show that God is different in principle from the 
world. It states only that God cannot lose his divinity. This element of the divine tran­
scendence has to do with his absoluteness, i.e. the divine independence. God is inde­
pendent because his is unchangeably the Supreme Being regardless of the state of 
other beings42. This means that God cannot lose his supremacy.
40 Hartshome, Creative, pp. 230-232.
41 Ibid., pp. 233-234.
42 Sia, God in, pp. 42-43.
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CONCLUSION
Why is it so important to conceive God as a being, which is essentially different 
from the world? The point is that God must have some features, which make him 
divine and not a worldly being. The conclusion I am coming to is that the only es­
sential elements in Hartshome’s theory, which distinguish God from the world as 
such, are the divine unity and personality. These are values, which the world does 
not have. But on the other hand we find the same features in the particular elements 
of the world. Humans are personal and every being is a unity of some objects. God, 
who is also a person, contrary to any other personal being, cannot choose evil. God 
also lures the world to harmony. Might God be in this case superhuman? It seems 
that this is possible. Only the last two features distinguish the divine personality from 
any other personal being.
What about the notion of unsurpassability? Unsurpassability, as I see it, is rather 
a value, which makes God only quantitatively different from the world. It makes God 
different from the world but insufficiently so. There are different degrees of transcend­
ence. The most important question is can we call God something, which differs so lit­
tle from the world? The transcendence of God is limited merely to his unsurpassabili­
ty. We should remember that eminence and worshipfullness are related to the divine 
unsurpassability. It is true that the Hartshomean panentheism differs from pantheism. 
If God by definition has to be essentially different from the world then the Hartshome­
an God just barely fulfills this criterion. It seems that this solution is rather closer to 
pantheism than to classical theism. Therefore it is not a central solution in respect to 
pantheism and classical theism as claimed by Hartshome. We should remember that 
pantheism is often accused of being a hidden form of atheism.
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